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MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE UNDER RECIDIVIST STATUTE IS NOT
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)
The United States Supreme Court severely restricted the eighth
amendment's prohibition against disproportionate punishments' in
holding that a mandatory life sentence imposed under Texas' recidivist
statute2 does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
Petitioner was sentenced under Texas' recidivist statute4 to a
mandatory life term following his conviction for fraudulent procure-
ment of $120.75.' Petitioner's two prior convictions for unlawful use of
a credit card to obtain goods valued at $80,6 and for passing a forged
instrument in the amount of $28.36, 7 invoked the recidivist statute.
The state court upheld the conviction,8 and the United States district
court denied petitioner's writ of habeas corpus without a hearing.9 Al-
I. For cases recognizing the eighth amendment prohibition against disproportionate sen-
tencing, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 676, 685 (1978) (dictum); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (plurality); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (dictum); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103 n.7 (1976) (dictum); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plural-
ity) (dictum); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). See generally W. LEFAVE & A.
Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 22 at 163 (1972); Jefferies & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Bur-
den of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1377 (1979); Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual
Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1979); Turkington,
Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the
Weems Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 145, 147 (1967); Wheeler, Towarda Theory of Limited Punish-
ment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 841 (1972); Note, The
Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 846, 847 (1961); Note, Recidivist Statutes and the Eighth Amendment: 4 Disproportionality
Analysis, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 147.
2. TEX. REV. CRIM. STAT. art. 63 (1925) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974)).
3. Rummel v. Estelle, 495 U.S. 263 (1980).
4. TEX. REV. CRIM. STAT. art. 63 (1925) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974)).
5. See TEx. REV. CIUM. STAT. art. 1410 (1925) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
tit. 7, § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 1980)) (Rummel's offense is no longer considered a felony under the
current version).
6. See 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 885 (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 32.31
(Vernon 1974)).
7. See TE. REV. CRIM. STAT. art. 996 (1925) (current version at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
tit. 7, § 32.21 (Vernon 1974)).
8. Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
9. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1978).
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though a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction,' 0 the decision was vacated on rehearing en banc."l The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the en banc decision and held:
Petitioner's mandatory life sentence does not constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 12
In England, the Magna Carta 3 and the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the English Bill of Rights' 4 prohibited the imposition of
disproportionate punishments. 15 The eighth amendment incorporated
almost identical language from the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the English Bill of Rights.' 6
State legislatures first enacted recidivist statutes in 1796.17 Forty-six
of the fifty states presently have some form of recidivist or enhance-
ment statute to deal with repeat offenders.'" Recidivist statutes are in-
10. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978) (sentence held to be cruel and unusual
punishment).
11. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
12. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
13. J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323 (1965). "A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial
offense, except in accordance with the degree of the offense; and for a serious offense he shall be
amerced according to its gravity." Id.
14. The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Bill of Rights of 1688 provides: "That
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, ch. 2, reprintedin R. PERRY & J. COOPER,
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTY 247 (1959).
15. "The English evidence shows that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Bill of
Rights of 1689 was first, an objection to the imposition of punishments which were unauthorized
by statute.., and second, a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties."
Granucci, "Not Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inlicted-" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV.
839, 860 (1969) (emphasis added). See also Wheeler, supra note 1, at 853.
16. See notes 14-15 supra.
17. See 1796 N.Y. Laws 696, ch. 30; 1796 Va. Acts ch. 2, §§ 24, 42.
18. See ALA. CODE § 13-A-5-9 (Supp. 1978); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1980); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13.604 (West Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5-
.6 (Deering Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
40(c) to 40(e) (1979); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4214, 4215 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104a
(1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 1976 & Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2511 (1978);
HAWAIl REV. STAT. § 706-662(4) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 33B-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Bums Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 902.8 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (Supp. 1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532:080 (Baldwin Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (West Supp. 1980); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27 § 643B (Supp. 1980); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 25 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1084 (Supp. 1980); 1978 Minn. Laws 770 (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 609.346); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 558.016, 571.015 (Supp.
1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 46-18-501 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 207.010 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c-44-3
(West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06, .08, .10
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/8
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variably upheld against challenges 9 that they violate the privileges and
immunities, 20 equal protection, 21 due process, 22 double jeopardy,23 ex
post facto,24 and cruel and unusual punishment25 clauses of the Consti-
(McKinney Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.5 (Supp. 1979)i N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
32-09 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 51 (West Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725
(1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (1969); S.C. CODE § 17-25-40 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-7-7 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-1001, -1002 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 11 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West 1958 & Supp. 1980); WYo STAT. §§ 6-1-109, -110 (1977).
19. See generally Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REV.
99, 110-19 (1971); Note, A Closer Look at Habitual CriminalStatutes: Brown v. Parrat and Martin
v. Parrat, A Case Study ofthe Nebraska Law, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 282 (1979); Note, Don't
Steal a Turkey in Arkansas- The Second Felony Offender in New York, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 76,
76 (1976); Note, Recidivist Laws Under the Eighth Amendment, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 606, 612-13
(1979); Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 597, 602-07 (1962);
Note, Recidivist Statutes and the Eighth Amendment: A DisproportionalityAnalysis, supra note 1, at
148.
20. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673
(1895) (dictum).
21. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 454-56 (1962); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616,
629-31 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S.
673, 677-78 (1895); Ohler v. Beto, 356 F.2d 879, 880 (5th Cir. 1966); People v. Luckey, 90 111. App.
2d 325, 331, 234 N.E.2d 26, 29-30 (1967), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970); State v. Maldonado,
176 Mont. 322, 328-29, 578 P.2d 296, 300 (1978); State v. Thomas, 16 Wash. App. 1, 15-16, 553
P.2d 1357, 1366 (1976).
22. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-69 (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451-54
(1962); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1912); Martin v. Parratt, 549 F.2d 50, 52
(8th Cir. 1977); Capuchino v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 842
(1975); Johnson v. Kansas, 284 F.2d 344, 345 (10th Cir. 1960); State v. Maldonado, 176 Mont. 322,
328-29, 578 P.2d 296, 300 (1978); Vess v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 487, 491, 376 S.W.2d 446, 448 (1964);
State v. Thomas, 16 Wash. App. 1, 15-16, 553 P.2d 1357, 1366 (1976). Contra, Hicks v. Oklahoma,
445 U.S. 901 (1980).
23. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616,
624-29 (1912); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676-77 (1895); Woodward v. Beto, 447 F.2d 103,
104-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971).
24. See Fong v. United States, 287 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 971 (1961);
Cooper v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 464,465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Vess v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 487,
490-91, 376 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (1964).
25. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180
U.S. 311, 313 (1901); Martin v. Parratt, 549 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1977); Capuchino v. Estelle, 506
F.2d 440, 442-43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975); Cooper v. United States, 114 F.
Supp. 464, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Wilson v. State, 251 Ark. 900, 901-02, 475 S.W.2d 543, 544
(1972); Ex parte Rosencrantz, 205 Cal. 534, 537-40, 271 P. 902, 904-05 (1928) (en banc); In re
Boatwright, 119 Cal. App. 420, 423-24, 6 P.2d 972, 973 (1931); People v. Luckey, 90 I11. App. 2d
325, 331, 234 N.E.2d 26, 30 (1967), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970); Cox v. Commonwealth, 514
S.W.2d 49, 50 (Ky. 1974); Rolack v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Ky. 1974); State v.
Custer, 240 Or. 350, 352, 401 P.2d 402, 403 (1965); West v. State, 511 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974); Bennett v. State, 455 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); State v. Lee, 87
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tution. Only four sentences imposed under recidivist statutes have
been overturned 26 or altered.27  In two of the cases the sentence was
held to be cruel and unusual because of its excessive length.28
The eighth amendment prohibits both federal and state govern-
ments29 from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.3° Early inter-
pretations of the eighth amendment limited its scope to barbaric and
torturous forms of punishment.31 Later interpretations, however, ex-
panded the scope of the eighth amendment to include substantive limi-
tations on the type of conduct that can be considered crimina 3 2 and
prohibited the imposition of punishments that were disproportionate to
the crime charged.33
The United States Supreme Court has invoked the principle of pro-
portionality on only two occasions to overturn disproportionate punish-
Wash. 2d 932, 937, 558 P.2d 236, 239-40 (1976), appeal dismissed, 432 U.S. 901 (1977). But see
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 139-43 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974); Stephens v.
State, 73 Okla. Crim. 349, 352-54, 121 P.2d 326, 328 (1942).
26. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 901 (1980); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974).
27. See Stephens v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (1942).
28. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974) (mandatory
life sentence under recidivist statute overturned for perjury conviction where defendant had two
prior convictions for writing a check with insufficient funds and transporting forged checks across
state lines); Stephens v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (1942) (twenty-one month sen-
tence imposed under recidivist statute for a bigamy conviction reduced to nine months where
defendant had gotten divorced but remarried before the six month waiting period was up). See
also Hicks v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 901 (1980) (appellate court affirmance of mandatory forty year
sentence under recidivist statute previously held unconstitutional held to be a denial of due pro-
cess); Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980) (remand to district court for deter-
mination whether mandatory life sentence for sale of heroin constituted cruel and unusual
punishment).
29. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662 (1962) (applied the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment). See generally Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 1071 (1964); Turkington, supra note 1, at 152.
30. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
31. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136
(1878). See generally Jefferies & Stephan, supra note 1, at 1377; Turkington, supra note 1, at 145;
Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of a Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the
Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REY. 996, 1004 (1964); Note, Recidivist Statutes and the Eighth
Amendment: A1 Disproportionality Analysi, supra note 1, at 149.
32. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
666-67 (1962); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 22 at 163; Packer, supra note 25, at 1071.
33. See note I supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/8
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ments.34 The Court's infrequent reliance on the proportionality
principle reflects its uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the eighth
amendment.35 Because the framers of the Constitution adopted the
eighth amendment with little debate, there is a lack of legislative his-
tory to clarify this uncertainty.3 6 In addition, lower courts did not de-
velop an objective standard to judge cruel and unusual punishments.37
Thus, when faced with proportionality issues, courts invariably defer to
34. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910). Cf. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality) (eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments prohibit the imposition of mandatory death penalty); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (plurality) (same); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (capital pun-
ishment sentencing procedure violates the eighth amendment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962) (ninety day sentence for drug addiction cruel and unusual punishment); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (denationalization for wartime desertion cruel and unusual punishment).
Lower courts have overturned less than two dozen sentences because of excessive length. See
Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979), vacatedsubnom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980)
(vacated on appeal in light of the holding in Rummel); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert
denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 982 (1971); Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.D. 1978); Faulkner v. State,
445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968); In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1975); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (en banc); In re Lynch,
8 Cal. 3d 410,503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (en banc); People v. Keogh, 46 Cal. App. 3d
919, 120 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1975); Kenimer v. State, 83 Ga. App. 264, 63 S.E.2d 280 (1951); Bissell v.
Devore, 225 Iowa 815, 281 N.W. 740 (1938); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky.
1968); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); People v. Bruinsma, 34 Mich.
App. 167, 191 N.W.2d 108 (1971); Atwood v. State, 146 Miss. 662, 111 So. 865 (1927) (en banc);
Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc. 792, 262 N.Y.S. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1933); State v. Tyson, 223 N.C. 492,
27 S.E.2d 113 (1943); Stephens v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (1942); Cannon v.
Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955) (en banc); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d
273 (1930); Cason v. State, 160 Tenn. 267, 23 S.W.2d 665 (1930).
35. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879).
36. 1 ANNAIs OF CONGRESS 754 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1789):
MR. SMITH, of South Carolina, objected to the words "nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments;" the import of them being too indefinite.
MR. LwERMORE: The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think
it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges?
What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine. Nor cruel and
unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains
often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be
prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient
mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be in-
vented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some
security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws
by any declaration of this kind.
The question was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a considerable majority.
Id. at 754.
37. Note, Recidivist Statutes and the Eighth Amendment: A Disproportionality Anais&, supra
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legislative judgments."8
The Supreme Court first recognized the eighth amendment prohibi-
tion against disproportionate sentences in a dissenting opinion in
O'Neil v. Vermont.?9 The Court in Weems v. United States4" subse-
quently adopted the O'Neil dissent as a majority view.4 In Weems a
United States Coast Guard disbursing officer, convicted for falsifying a
public document while stationed in the Philippine Islands,42 was sen-
tenced to fifteen years of "hard and painful labor in chains. 43 In hold-
ing the sentence cruel and unusual, the Court found it a "precept of
justice that punishment for a crime. . . be graduated and proportioned
to the offense."'
The Court in Weems compared the punishment imposed on the de-
fendant with the punishment imposed for similar crimes in other juris-
dictions and the punishment for more serious crimes within the same
jurisdiction.45 After concluding that the sentence imposed on Weems
note 1, at 149-50. But see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938
(1974).
38. Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979); United
States v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir.
1974); Yeager v. Estelle, 489 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908 (1974); Page v.
United States, 462 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1972); Sluder v. Brantley, 454 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); United
States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964); Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333
(W.D.N.C. 1964); In re Boatwright, 119 Cal. App. 420, 6 P.2d 972 (1931); W. LAFAvE & A.
Scorr, supra note 1, § 22 at 164; Note, Recidivist Statutes and the Eighth Amendment.- A Dispro-
portionali
, 
Analysis, supra note 1, at 149; Note, Judicial Limitations on the Constitutional Protec-
tion Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160, 169.
39. 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). In his dissent Mr. Justice Field stated:
"The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments [which inflict torture], but against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences
charged." Id. at 339-40.
40. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 364.
43. Id. In addition to a fifteen year term of confinement, the sentence imposed on Weems
included hard labor chains at both hands and feet, no marital or parental authority, no property
rights, restrictions on family contact, and perpetual surveillance after release from prison. Id.
44. Id. at 367.
45. Id. at 380-81. This comparative approach was implicitly rejected seven years later in
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916). In Badders, Justice Holmes ignored Weems and
relied on Howard v. Flemming, 191 U.S. 126, 135-36 (1903), which rejected the comparative ap-
proach. In recent decisions, however, the Court has compared statutes and punishments in assess-
ing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96
(1977) (plurality); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
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552 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:546
was cruel and unusual in its "degree and kind,"14 6 the Court found both
the length and the "accessories" of the sentence to be cruel and unusual
under the eighth amendment.47 In addition the Court recognized the
evolving nature of the eighth amendment and found that the amend-
ment must be capable of broader interpretations as "conditions and
purposes" change.48
Recent Supreme Court decisions adopt the Weems broad interpreta-
tion of the eighth amendment.49 In Trop v. Dulles5" the Court found
that the scope of the eighth amendment is not static, but incorporates
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."'" The expansive interpretation of the eighth amendment was
used to overturn punishment of denationalization for wartime deser-
tions;52 imposition of a ninety day sentence for drug addiction;53 impo-
sition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner;54
and mandatory imposition of the death penalty.5
46. 217 U.S. at 377.
47. Weems suggests that either ground would have merited reversal of the sentence. "It is
cruel in its excess ofimprisonment and that which accompanies andfallows imprisonment. . . . Its
punishments come under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree
and kind." Id. at 377 (emphasis added). But see Mulligan, supra note 1, at 643; Packer, supra
note 29, at 1075.
48. 217 U.S. at 373. The Court further stated:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth.... In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be
only of what has been but of what may be.
Id. The Court referred to its broad interpretations of the general language in the commerce
clause, the due process clause, and the provision prohibiting ex post facto laws as justifying an
expansive reading of the eighth amendment. Id. at 373-75.
49. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 676, 685 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977)
(plurality); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(plurality); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 263-64
(Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 325 (Marshall, J., concurring); Id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(plurality).
50. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality).
51. Id. at 100-01.
52. Id.
53. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
54. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
55. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S: 280 (1976) (plurality).
The eighth amendment was also applied to improve inadequate conditions in penal institutions.
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (prison condition of isolation held to be cruel); Estelle v.
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In Coker v. Georgia56 the Supreme Court invoked the eighth amend-
ment to overturn imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
rape.17 In holding the death penalty disproportionate to the underlying
crime, the Court found that a punishment is excessive and unconstitu-
tional if it makes "no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment [or is] grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime."58 The Court in Coker considered the nature of the offense, the
punishment imposed by other jurisdictions for the same offense, and
the frequency with which juries impose the death penalty for rape 9 to
assess the proportionality of the punishment.
The lower courts have applied three distinct standards to review the
proportionality of a sentence under the eighth amendment. One group
of cases flatly rejects proportionality analysis and considers an attack
on a sentence to be an attack on the statute itself.6" If the statute is
constitutional, then any sentence imposed within limits set by the stat-
ute is necessarily constitutional.6" A second group of cases reviews a
sentence imposed within the statutory limits only when "exceptional
circumstances" exist.62 A final group of decisions inspects the individ-
ual facts of each case to determine whether a sentence is disproportion-
ate.63 The courts in these decisions assess the gravity of the offense,
determine the legislative purpose of the statute, and compare the pun-
ishment imposed with the punishment imposed for the same offense in
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference by prison officials to prisoner's serious illness
or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
56. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality).
57. Id. at 592. The Court limited its decision to the rape of an adult woman and did not
decide whether statutes authorizing the death penalty for raping a child constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 596.
58. Id. at 592.
59. Id. at 593-97.
60. E.g., United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1023 (1969); Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1960).
61. Id.
62. Courts applying this standard invariably uphold the imposition of the sentence and do
not define what constitutes "exceptional circumstances." E.g., United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d
764, 766 (4th Cir. 1964); Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 337 (W.D.N.C. 1964). Other
courts using a similar standard refuse to review a sentence within the statutory limits unless it
"shocks the conscience." See, e.g., Capuchino v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423
U.S. 823 (1975); Yeager v. Estelle, 489 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1973); Exparte Rosencrantz, 205 Cal.
534, 539, 271 P. 902, 904 (1928).
63. Important factors in assessing the nature of an offense are the presence or absence of
violence and danger to other persons. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cit. 1973), cer.
denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974).
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other jurisdictions and with the punishment fixed for other crimes
within the same jurisdiction.' 4
In Rummel v. Estelle65 the United States Supreme Court, in a plural-
ity opinion,66 refused to apply the eighth amendment to invalidate a
life sentence imposed under the Texas recidivist statute.67 The plural-
ity, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, reiterated that the eighth
amendment embodies a principle of proportionality, 68 but refused to
apply the proportionality principle to the particular facts.69
The Court first distinguished both Coker and Weems as inapplicable
to the Rummel facts.7" Because Coker involved capital punishment,
which is qualitatively different in "kind" from any term of confine-
ment, the Coker standard could not be applied in a noncapital case.71
Additionally, Weems could not be applied to challenge the length of a
sentence alone because it involved both cruel "accessories" and a long
term of confinement.72
The Court addressed the relative "pettiness" of Rummel's crimes in
relation to the punishment imposed and noted that the lack of violence
and the small amount of money involved were not objective indicators
of the severity of the crimes.71 Texas' interest in punishing Rummel,
64. See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979);
Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977); Hall v. McKen-
zie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); Wood v. South Carolina, 483 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1973); Hart v.
Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974).
65. 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (plurality).
66. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
White and Blackmun.
67. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
68. Id. at 272.
69. Id. at 272-73.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 272.
72. Id. at 273-74. The punishment in Weems, in addition to a fifteen year term of confine-
ment, included hard labor, chains at both the hands and feet, no marital or parental authority, no
property rights, restrictions on family contact, and perpetual surveillance after release from prison.
Justice Rehnquist distinguished Weems from Rummel's challenge to the proportionality of his
term of confinement on the basis of these "accessories," stating that, "we do not believe that
Weems can be applied without regard to its peculiar facts: the triviality of the charged offense, the
impressive length of the minimum term of imprisonment, and the extraordinary nature of the
'accessories' included within the punishment . I. " d. at 274.
73. The Court argued that the seriousness of a crime is determined by "the strength of soci-
ety's interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal." Examples such
as bribery and corporate violations of clean air and water statutes are serious offenses that do not
involve violence. Additionally, the Court asserted that the line distinguishing more serious from
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however, stemmed from the defendant's repeated criminal behavior.74
The imposition of a harsher penalty is justified because Texas has a
greater interest in dealing more severely with recidivists than with first
time offenders.75
In reviewing recidivist statutes in other states the Court noted that
two states,76 in addition to Texas, impose mandatory life sentences af-
ter three felony convictions.77 The Court, however, discredited the util-
ity of examining sentences imposed by other jurisdictions in noncapital
cases because additional factors, including the prosecutorial discretion
initially to invoke the recidivist statute78 and the possibility of early
release through parole,79 must be considered in noncapital cases. 80
In concluding that the sentence imposed under the Texas recidivist
statute was not cruel and unusual, the Court found that the length of a
sentence is "purely a matter of legislative prerogative."' Thus, any
trend toward less severe discretionary sentences "must find its source
. . . in the legislatures, not in the federal courts."'
Justice Stewart found in concurrence that although the imposition of
severe sentences on recidivists may be unwise, it does not transgress the
minimum constitutional standard. 3
Justice Powell, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens,84 found support in prior case law for the application of a pro-
portionality test in noncapital cases.85 The dissent noted that the na-
less serious crimes based upon the amount of money involved is a subjective decision best left to
the legislature. Id. at 274.
74. Id. at 276.
75. Id. at 277.
76. Id. at 279.
77. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977). Rummel
attempted to distinguish these statutes on the grounds of the Fourth Circuit's limited application
of West Virginia recidivist statute and the Washington Supreme Court's implication that it would
apply disproportionality analysis in an appropriate situation. Brief for Petitioner at 39 nn.28 & 29,
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
78. 445 U.S. at 281 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
79. Id. at 280-81.
80. Id. at 281.
81. Id. at 274.
82. Id. at 284.
83. Id. at 285. This is a reiteration of Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (upholding the constitutionality of Texas' recidivist statute).
84. 445 U.S. at 285.
85. Id. at 289 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
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ture of the offense, the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the
same crime, and the sentence imposed for other crimes within the same
jurisdiction should be considered to assess the proportionality of a sen-
tence.16 The dissent maintained that Rummel's crimes were relatively
minor in nature87 because they were nonviolent offenses88 amounting
to less than $230 and Rummel's third offense was no longer a felony
under Texas law.8 9 Thus, the life sentence was disproportionate to the
crime.9 0 Finally, the dissent found that the disproportionality analysis
of the Fourth Circuit could be applied to noncapital cases without im-
pinging the principles of federalism and state autonomy.9'
The Court's reluctance to apply proportionality analysis in noncapi-
tal cases is unwarranted. Neither Weems nor Coker restricts the appli-
cation of proportionality analysis to capital cases. Because the Court in
Weems found the punishment imposed "cruel in its excess of imprison-
ment," as well as in the accessories that accompanied imprisonment, 92
U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
86. 445 U.S. at 295 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977) (plurality)); id. at
603 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
87. 445 U.S. at 295.
88. Id.
89. Id. Between the time Rummel was convicted as an habitual offender and the time the
Court heard the case, Texas reclassified his third offense, theft by false pretext, as a misdemeanor.
Id. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 3103(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
90. Id. at 300-02. The dissent also analyzed other state recidivist statutes, noting that out of
12 states that had statutes punishing nonviolent recidivists with mandatory life sentences, only
three remain. Id. at 295-96 n.13 and accompanying text. The vast majority of states punishes
recidivists with discretionary or graduated sentences, depending on the severity of the crimes. Id.
at 298-99 nn.15-18. Moreover, the dissent found that Texas punishes first and second time offend-
ers proportionately, but all third time offenders receive a mandatory life sentence. Id. at 300-01.
See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.31-.34 (with exception of capital murder, all felonies
classified by degree, and length of sentence is discretionary); 12.42(a), 12.42(b) (commission of
second felony increases degree of felony, but sentence remains discretionary); 12.42(d)
(mandatory life sentence for third felony conviction).
91. 445 U.S. at 305-06 (citing Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979), vacated 445 U.S.
947 (1980) (vacated and remanded for a decision consistent with Rummel)); Roberts v. Collins,
544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977); Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232
(4th Cir. 1976); Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975);
United States v. Atkinson, 513 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Wooten, 503 F.2d 65 (4th
Cir. 1974); Wood v. South Carolina, 483 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1973); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136
(4th Cir. 1973), ceri. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974); Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir.
1972); United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964).
92. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910).
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the Court implied a prohibition against disproportionate sentences.93
Furthermore, the Court in Coker devised its proportionality analysis
from several noncapital cases. 94
The Court's failure to consider the overall nature of Rummel's of-
fenses in assessing the constitutionality of the sentence results in faulty
reasoning. An objective assessment of the seriousness of any crime
must rest on an analysis of all elements of the crime,95 including
whether violence is involved96 and the amount of money or property
involved.97 The lack of violence and danger to persons,98 the relatively
small amount of money involved in the crimes, 99 and the subsequent
reclassification of Rummel's last offense as a misdemeanor' ° suggest
that imposition of a life sentence was disproportionate in Rummel's
case.101
In hiding behind the concepts of "state autonomy" and "federalism,"
the Rummel Court avoids applying proportionality analysis to length of
confinement. Although Texas may have a greater interest in punishing
recidivists more severely than first time offenders, 102 the interest does
not justify imposition of disproportionate sentences on recidivists. The
cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibits sentence disproportion-
ality whether the offender is convicted of a first or a third offense.
93. Id. The Court stated that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to offense." Id. at 367. The issue before the Court was whether "a
punishment of fifteen years imprisonment was a cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 362. Ad-
ditionally Weems characterized O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), as raising the same issue.
217 U.S. at 371. In OWeil one of the issues was whether a 54 year sentence for the sale of illegal
whiskey was cruel and unusual punishment. But see Mulligan, supra note 1, at 643; Packer, supra
note 29, at 1075. The authors contend that Weems would have been decided differently absent the
"accessories" accompanying the term of confinement.
94. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972) (capital), Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (noncapital), Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (same), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (same)).
95. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
96. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974);
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 788 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 942 (1970) ("there are ra-
tional graduations of culpability that can be made on the basis of injury to the victim.").
97. See, e.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938
(1974).
98. 445 U.S. at 265-66.
99. The total dollar amount of Rummel's crimes was $229.1 I. Id See notes 5-7 supra and
accompanying text.
100. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
101. 445 U.S. at 273, 281-84.
102. See id. at 276; Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 415 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091
(1979).
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The Court improperly injected parole considerations into the analy-
sis of disproportionate sentences.' 0 3 Because the decision to grant or
deny parole is an entirely discretionary matter,' 4 a prisoner does not
have an enforceable right to early release and may serve the complete
term of a sentence. The chance of parole is not a guarantee of early
release.'1 5 The determination of a sentence's proportionality under the
eighth amendment should not rest on considerations of parole when
early release is neither a guaranteed nor an enforceable right.'"
In holding that Texas' imposition of a mandatory life sentence under
a recidivist statute was not cruel and unusual punishment, the Court
ignored two principles applicable in eighth amendment analysis. First,
the principle that eighth amendment judgments should be informed by
objective factors to the maximum possible extent is well settled.10 7
While the dissent posited objective criteria applicable in proportional-
ity analysis,' 08 the plurality failed to formulate or apply an objective
test.'0 9 Second, eighth amendment decisions repeatedly assert that the
scope of the amendment is not static, but is measured by "evolving
103. 445 U.S. at 280.
104. A prisoner could have a perfect conduct record and be denied parole. Factors outside of
the prisoner's control, such as prior commitments, family background, age, and the family and
community available to receive a parolee, are considered. See 1978 HANDBOOK ON PAROLE,
MANDATORY SUPERVISIO, AND ExEcUTIVE CLEMENCY 23-26 (1978) (cited in Brief for Petitioner
at 35 n.22, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)).
Although Rummel could be eligible for parole after 10 years, his release would be dependent
upon a favorable recommendation by the Parole Board and final approval by the Governor. See
TEx. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15(a)-(b), (e)-(g) (Vernon 1979); TEXAS REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1 (3) (Vernon Supp. 1980). In June 1979 the Governor of Texas denied 79%
of parole recommendations, and for a six month period in 1979 he denied 33% of the parole
recommendations submitted to him. These figures indicate the discretion exercised by the Gover-
nor. Austin American-Statesman, Sept. 23, 1979, at 1, col. I; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 10- 11
n. 11, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
105. Id.
106. See 445 U.S. at 293-94 (Powell, J., dissenting); Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
(no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of sentence);
Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978) (Texas prisoner has no constitutionally enforcea-
ble interest in being freed before the expiration of his sentence); Craft v. Texas Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 550 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1977) (same).
107. E.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
108. 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Coker v. Geogia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
109. 445 U.S. at 281-82.
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standards of decency."" In ignoring the expansive nature of the
eighth amendment, the plurality limits the amendment's application to
capital cases and unusual forms of punishment while foreclosing any
realistic possibility of successfully attacking an excessive term of con-
finement.
The Rummel decision is a step backward in eighth amendment
analysis. The Supreme Court's decision severely restricts proportional-
ity analysis and renders the eighth amendment ineffective to challenge
imposition of disproportionate terms of confinement. The Court
should reconsider the issue presented in Rummel and adopt an objec-
tive and expansive interpretation of the eighth amendment."
110. Id. at 291 (Powell, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 266 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality).
111. In October, U.S. District Judge Dorwin W. Suttle overturned Rummel's 1973 conviction
on the grounds that his original lawyer failed to investigate potential witnesses before trial. Suttle
held that Rummel received ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered Rummel's release unless
Texas granted him a new trial within 120 days. Rummel v. Estelle, 498 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Tex.
1980). Rummel and the District Attorney's office entered into a plea bargain whereby Rummel
agreed to plead guilty to his last offense of fraudulently obtaining $120.75 and waive all malprac-
tice claims against his original attorney, while the District Attorney and the Attorney General
would (1) drop their appeal for a new trial for Rummel; (2) recommend a lesser sentence amount-
ing to less than that Rummel had already served; and (3) essentially ignore Rummers prior con-
victions, thus avoiding the habitual offender statute. The plea bargain was accepted and on
November 14, 1980, Rummel left jail, a free man. L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, at 1, col. 3; Houston
City Magazine, Jan. 1981, at 8.
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